

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BERN127, NATO KFOR MISSION: SWISS NOT PLANNING ANY CHANGES \

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09BERN127**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09BERN127	2009-03-20 16:40	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Bern

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers

VZCZCXRO5710
OO RUEHSR
DE RUEHSD #0127/01 0791640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201640Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5730
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0006
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0087
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 1172
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0009
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0035
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0190
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3024
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0855
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0057
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0330

2009-03-20 16:40:00 09BERN127 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 09STATE26179 VZCZCXRO5710\
OO RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSD #0127/01 0791640\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 201640Z MAR 09\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5730\
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0006\
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0087\
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 1172\
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0009\
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0035\
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0190\
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3024\
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0855\
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0057

RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 1172\
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0009\
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0035\
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0190\
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3024\
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0855\
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0057\
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY\
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0330 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000127 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (C.DAVY) AND EUR/CE (C.HODGES) \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019 \
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO KPKO KV SZ
SUBJECT: NATO KFOR MISSION: SWISS NOT PLANNING ANY CHANGES \
IN FORCE CONTRIBUTION \
\
REF: STATE 26179 \
\
Classified By: Acting Political-Economic Affairs Counselor Chris Buck; \
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). \
\
----- - \
SWISS PLANNING NO CHANGES IN KFOR CONTRIBUTION \
----- - \
\
11. (C) Acting POL-ECON Counselor and DAO representative \
delivered the reftel message on March 19 to Marlene Odermatt, \
Policy Advisor for International Relations and Strategy at \
the Swiss Federal Ministry of Defense. Odermatt said that \
Switzerland has no plans to change its current force \
contribution to KFOR. In collegial but appropriately \
cautious fashion, she referred to the fact that current Swiss \
DefMin Ueli Maurer generally espouses his Swiss People's \
Party (SVP) aversion to foreign deployments. However, \
Odermatt underlined that DefMin Maurer is well aware of the \
importance of Balkan security to Swiss interests, given the \
region's proximity to Switzerland and the large Kosovo expat \
population living in Switzerland. She further emphasized \
that the DefMin is taking a fact-based (i.e., \
non-ideological) approach to foreign deployment issues as \
they are discussed within the MOD. In that context, Odermatt \
mentioned that DefMin Maurer on his own initiative was in the \
early stages of considering travel to Kosovo, to visit the \
Swiss KFOR contingent (SWISSCOY) and Kosovo officials. \
\
12. (C) Also on March 19, A/POL-ECON Counselor passed the \
message (reftel, para 5) via telephone to Didier Chassot, \
Swiss MFA Regional Coordinator for South-Eastern Europe; \
Chassot was not available to meet, due to pending travel out \
of Bern. In a follow up meeting at the MFA on March 20, \
Chassot informed A/POL-ECON Counselor that the MFA concurred \
with the USG's views and concerns with regard to the KFOR \
posture -- the "job is not yet done." Responding to \
A/POL-ECON Counselor's query regarding the Swiss government's \
current position with regard to the Kosovo Security Force \
Trust Fund, Chassot said that, although Switzerland is \
strongly committed to Kosovo's future, he does not believe it \
likely that Switzerland will make a contribution to the \
Kosovo Security Force Trust Fund, due to domestic political \
considerations. (Note: Though the Swiss arms industry \
routinely is permitted to make foreign commercial sales to a \
range of countries, the Swiss generally are more reluctant to \
provide foreign security assistance other than in ways that \
clearly have only humanitarian or civil-military \
applications, such as the types of training provided at the \
Swiss Geneva Center for Security Policy. End Note) \
\
----- \
QUICK REFERENCE: SWITZERLAND AND KOSOVO/KFOR \
----- \
\
13. (U) Switzerland recognized Kosovo independence on February \
27, 2008 -- ten days after Kosovo's declaration. In March \
2008, Switzerland became one of the first countries to open \
an embassy in Pristina. FM Calmy-Rey traveled to Pristina \
for the opening. The Swiss government pledged CHR 77 million \
(USD 69 million) in development assistance over three years \
at the July 2008 international donors' conference for Kosovo. \
\\

Approximately 150,000 Kosovo Albanians reside in \
Switzerland, most on long-term residency permits. \
\

¶4. (U) The Swiss government made its initial decision to \
participate in KFOR in June 1999. Switzerland's \
participation in KFOR is based on UNSCR 1244 and a mandate \
from the Swiss Parliament. The parliamentary mandate was \
renewed last July through the end of 2011. Up to 220 Swiss \
military personnel (all volunteers only) serve in the \
SWISSCOY, which is composed of support and infantry \
companies, and an aviation detachment with two Superpuma \
transport helicopters. The SWISSCOY is stationed in \
Multinational Task Force South (MNTF-S), but can be employed \
throughout Kosovo. The Swiss personnel are co-located with \
Austrian personnel at Camp Casablanca. The Swiss MOD's \
budget for its KFOR deployment in 2008 was CHF 37.5 million \
\

BERN 00000127 002 OF 002 \
\

\ \
(USD 33.5 million). \
CARTER \
\